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Abstract
Background—Optimal decision making requires that organisms correctly evaluate both the
costs and benefits of potential choices. Dopamine transmission within the nucleus accumbens
(NAc) has been heavily implicated in reward learning and decision making, but it is unclear how
dopamine release may contribute to decisions that involve costs.
Methods—Cost-based decision making was examined in rats trained to associate visual cues
with either immediate or delayed rewards (delay manipulation) or low effort or high effort rewards
(effort manipulation). After training, dopamine concentration within the NAc was monitored on a
rapid timescale using fast-scan cyclic voltammetry.
Results—Animals exhibited a preference for immediate or low effort rewards over delayed or
high effort rewards of equal magnitude. Reward-predictive cues, but not response execution or
reward delivery, evoked increases in NAc dopamine concentration. When only one response
option was available, cue-evoked dopamine release reflected the value of the future reward, with
larger increases in dopamine signaling higher value rewards. In contrast, when both options were
presented simultaneously, dopamine signaled the better of two options, regardless of the future
choice.
Conclusions—Phasic dopamine signals in the NAc reflect two different types of reward cost
and encode potential rather than chosen value under choice situations.
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Introduction
The ability to weigh the costs and benefits of potential actions is critical for adaptive
decision making and is disrupted in numerous psychiatric disorders (1–3). For decisions that
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involve rewards, two fundamental costs include the amount of effort and the time
investment that must be committed when seeking rewards. Cost-based decision making
engages a specific network of brain nuclei including the nucleus accumbens (NAc) and
midbrain dopaminergic neurons (4). Dopamine depletion or antagonism in the NAc
produces profound deficits in operant responding when reinforcement is contingent upon
high response costs (5), and NAc manipulations bias animals away from choices that
involve high effort or long delays, even when those choices lead to larger or superior
rewards (5,6). NAc dopamine is also heavily implicated in behavioral responses to reward-
paired cues and the ability of such cues to influence decision making. Reward paired stimuli
evoke robust dopamine release in the NAc (7,8), and the magnitude of dopamine signaling
reflects complex information concerning the value of predicted rewards (9–12). Thus,
dopamine release in the NAc may not only be necessary to overcome large costs, but may
also facilitate choice behavior when available options have different costs. Here, we reveal
that phasic dopamine transmission in the NAc reflects two different types of reward cost
(effort and delay) when available options are limited, but encodes the value of the best
option rather than the chosen option under decision situations.
Methods and Materials
NAc dopamine concentration was monitored in rats (n = 10) trained in either effort-based or
delay-based decision tasks (Figures 1A and S1; also see Supplementary Methods in
Supplement 1). In these tasks, rewards of equal magnitude (45mg sucrose pellets) were
made available at either low or high value in pseudo-randomly ordered trials, with 90 total
trials per behavioral session. On forced-choice trials (60 per session), distinct 5s cue lights
signaled the available response option and future reward value. In the effort task, cues
predicted low cost (FR1) and high cost (FR16) rewards, whereas in the delay task cues
predicted immediate (FR1, 0s delay) and delayed (FR1, 5s delay) rewards. On forced choice
trials, responses on the non-cued option constituted errors, which terminated the trial
without reward. On free-choice trials (30 per session), both cue lights were presented
simultaneously and either option (low or high cost and immediate or delayed reward) could
be selected. These trials served to provide a behavioral index of value preference. Following
initial training, all rats were surgically prepared for electrochemical recording in the NAc
core (see Supplementary Methods in Supplement 1). After recovery and additional training,
changes in NAc dopamine concentration were recorded in real time using fast-scan cyclic
voltammetry during behavioral performance (n = 7 sessions from 6 animals for effort task; n
= 8 sessions from 4 animals in delay task; see Figure S2 (in Supplement 1) for histological
reconstruction).
Results
During behavioral sessions, animals readily overcame high effort demands or long delays to
obtain rewards (Figure 1B, E) and discriminated between reward-predictive cues to reduce
errors on forced-choice trials (error rates significantly below chance levels; p < 0.0001 for
all comparisons; Figure 1C,F). On free-choice trials, animals exhibited a marked preference
for low cost and immediate reward options over high cost and delayed reward options
(paired t-test on choice allocation; p < 0.01 for both comparisons; Figure 1D,G), indicating
that the value of future rewards was substantially discounted by heavy costs. See
Supplementary Results (in Supplement 1) for additional behavioral findings.
Consistent with previous reports (7,8), reward-predictive cues in all trial types of both
decision tasks evoked phasic increases in dopamine release (Figures 1H,I and S3 [in
Supplement 1] for single-trial examples). Increases occurred immediately after cue
presentation and were of short duration, as dopamine concentration returned to near baseline
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levels before lever extension and behavioral responding. Increases were not observed during
lever press responses or reward delivery (Dunnett’s comparison with baseline; p > 0.05 for
all trial types). Therefore, our analysis focused on investigating whether cue-evoked
dopamine signals encoded future reward value or other decision parameters. On forced-
choice trials, where cues were presented independently and only one option was available,
cue-evoked dopamine release tracked the value of future rewards despite the type of cost
involved. Low cost cues produced significantly larger increases in NAc dopamine
concentration than high cost cues (paired t-test, t = 4.859, df = 6, p = 0.0028; Figure 2A).
Likewise, immediate reward cues in the delay task evoked larger dopamine increases than
delayed reward cues (t = 3.58, df = 7, p = 0.009; Figure 2B). Dopamine signaling in the
nearby NAc shell showed the same trend, but cue-evoked dopamine differences did not
reach significant levels (t = 1.803, p = 0.12; see Supplemental Results and Figure S4 in
Supplement 1).
Since high cost trials in the effort task also effectively imposed a delay between the
initiation of responding and reward delivery (Figure S5 in Supplement 1), we next sought to
determine whether dopamine signaling encoded effort in addition to reward delay, or
encoded reward delay alone. As there was no difference in the average reward delay on high
cost trials (5.57 ± 0.49s) and delayed reward trials in the delay task (one sample t-test; t =
1.16, df = 6, p = 0.29; Figure S5B in Supplement 1), we directly compared the difference in
cue-evoked dopamine signals on forced choice trials between tasks (Figure S6 in
Supplement 1). This analysis revealed that the difference between cue-evoked dopamine
signals in the effort condition was significantly greater than the difference observed in the
delay condition (unpaired t-test; t = 2.31, df = 13, p = 0.029; Figure S6B in Supplement 1).
Specifically, the difference in dopamine evoked by low and high cost cues was more than
double the difference in dopamine evoked by immediate and delayed reward cues, indicating
that larger dopamine signals on high value trials were not completely explained by reward
delay alone.
Cue-evoked dopamine release could signal the value of the best available response option or
the value of the option that is eventually chosen (9), which are conflated on forced-choice
trials. Therefore, we investigated dopamine signaling on free-choice trials (where the chosen
outcome and best value are not always identical), by separating trials in which animals chose
the lower value reward and the higher value reward. This analysis revealed that dopamine
signals on free-choice trials were unrelated to the value of the chosen option (Figure 2C,D).
Rather, the simultaneous presentation of both high and low value cues on free-choice trials
produced no differences in NAc core dopamine release (effort-based task, t = 0.154, df = 3,
p = 0.8871; delayed-based task, t = 0.817, df = 4, p = 0.4599). For both experiments, cue-
evoked dopamine signals on free choice low value trials were not significantly different than
cue-evoked signals on forced choice high value trials (paired t-tests; both p’s > 0.5). Thus,
cue-evoked dopamine release on choice trials appeared to mimic the high-value dopamine
signal rather than the low-value dopamine signal, even when the low-value action was
subsequently chosen.
Discussion
Dopamine neurons encode a reward prediction error signal in which cues that predict
rewards evoke phasic increases in firing rate, whereas fully expected rewards do not alter
dopamine activity (13). This signal is also sensitive to a number of features of the upcoming
reward, as cues which predict larger, immediate, or more probable rewards evoke larger
spikes in dopamine neuron activity than cues which predict smaller, delayed, or less
probable rewards (9–11,14). In this way, dopamine neurons are thought to contribute to
reward-based decision making by broadcasting the value of potential actions to striatal and
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prefrontal circuits that control motivated behavior. Here, we demonstrate that dopamine
release in the NAc core faithfully reflects both the effort and temporal delay associated with
future rewards. Cues that signaled low cost, immediate rewards evoked greater increases in
dopamine concentration than cues that signaled high cost, delayed rewards. The present
results reveal that the cost-discounted value of impending rewards is also integrated with
reward-prediction signals within the NAc, which could be critical for tuning optimal
behavioral performance in the face of different costs. As such, the present results may help
explain why dopamine manipulations in the NAc produce such drastic effects on cost-based
decision making (15–17).
Efficient reward-related decision making requires that organisms discriminate between the
costs of available response options under choice situations. Importantly, value-based
dopamine signals could presciently encode either the value of a future choice or the value of
the best available choice, regardless of the future decision (9,18). Here, free-choice trials
were used to reveal a behavioral preference for low cost rewards, but also allowed us to
examine which type of valuation signal was encoded by NAc dopamine release. Faced with
different options, cue-evoked dopamine signals on these trials did not differ based on the
future choice, but instead reflected the high value option. Such signals are consistent with
recent reports of dopamine neuron activity (9) and suggest that in situations in which
decisions are required, NAc dopamine transmission encodes the value of the best available
option instead of the value of the subsequently chosen option (see Supplemental Materials in
Supplement 1 for further discussion).
Supplementary Material
Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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Behavioral preference tracks reward cost. (A) Schematic representing effort-based or delay-
based behavioral tasks. On forced-choice low cost/immediate reward trials (left panel), a cue
light was presented for 5s and was followed by extension of two response levers into the
behavioral chamber. A single lever press (FR1) on the lever corresponding to the cue light
led to immediate reward (45 mg sucrose) delivery in a centrally located food receptacle.
Responding on the other lever did not produce reward delivery and terminated the trial. On
forced choice high cost/delayed reward trials, the other cue light was presented for 5s before
lever extension. On these trials, a reward was delivered after either sixteen responses (FR16,
effort based decision task) or a delay (FR1 + 5s delay, delay based decision task). Responses
on the opposite lever terminated the trial and no reward was delivered. On free choice trials,
both cues were presented, and animals could select either response option. After training,
dopamine concentration in the NAc was measured using fast-scan cyclic voltammetry
during a single 90-trial behavioral session. Behavioral performance in effort (B–D) and
delay (E–G) based decision tasks during electrochemical recording. All data are mean ±
SEM. (B,E) Percentage of possible rewards obtained on forced-choice trials. Animals
overcame high effort requirements and reward delays to maximize rewards. (C,F)
Percentage of errors on forced-choice trials in both tasks were significantly below chance
levels (50%; p < 0.0001 for all comparisons), indicating behavioral discrimination between
cues. (D,G) Response allocation on free-choice trials, as percentage of choices. Dashed line
indicates indifference point. Animals robustly preferred the low cost and immediate reward
options (* p < 0.01). (H,I) Behavior-related changes in dopamine across multiple trials for
representative animals on effort (H) and delay (I) tasks. Heat plots represents individual trial
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data, rank ordered by distance from lever extension (black triangle) to reward delivery
(black circles), whereas bottom trace represents average from all trials. Data are aligned to
cue onset (horizontal bars). For all trial types, dopamine release peaks after cue presentation,
but high value cues evoke larger increases in dopamine concentration.
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Dopamine release in the NAc core encodes the value of the best available response. (A,B)
Left panels: Change in dopamine concentration on forced-choice trials, aligned to cue onset
(black bar). Right panels: Peak cue-evoked dopamine signal on forced choice trials. Cue
presentation on low cost and immediate reward trials led to significantly larger increases in
dopamine concentration than cue presentation on high cost and delayed reward trials,
respectively. (C,D) Change in dopamine concentration (left panels) and peak dopamine
signals (right panels) on free-choice trials. Conventions follow from A,B. On free-choice
trials, cue-evoked dopamine signals did not reflect the value of the chosen option. All data
are mean ± SEM. *p < 0.01. DA, dopamine; n.s., not significant.
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